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Social comparisons are associated with poorer and riskier financial decision making, 
no matter whether encounters are sporadic or repeated 
ABSTRACT 
Previous research suggests that social comparisons affect decision making under 
uncertainty. However, the role of the length of the social interaction for this relationship 
remains unknown. This experiment tests the effect of social comparisons on financial risk 
taking and how this effect is modulated by whether social encounters are sporadic or 
repeated. Participants carried out a computer task consisting of a series of binary choices 
between lotteries of varying profitability and risk, with real monetary stakes. After each 
decision, participants could compare their own payoff to that of a counterpart who made the 
same decision at the same time and whose choices/earnings did not affect the participants’ 
earnings. The design comprised three between-subjects treatments which differed in the 
nature of the social interaction: participants were informed that they would be matched with 
either (a) a different participant in each trial, (b) the same participant across all trials, or (c) 
a “virtual participant”, i.e. a computer algorithm. Compared to the non-social condition (c), 
subjects in both social conditions (a and b) chose lotteries with lower expected value (z=-
3.10, p<0.01) and higher outcome variance (z=2.13, p=0.03). However, no differences were 
found between the two social conditions (z=1.15, p=0.25 and z=0.35, p=0.73, respectively). 
These results indicate that social comparison information per se leads to poorer and riskier 
financial decisions, irrespective of whether or not the referent other is encountered 
repeatedly.  
Keywords: social comparisons; competition; risk taking; repeated interactions; social 
preferences 
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Introduction 
Social comparisons affect well-being and behavior in a wide range of contexts (Veblen 
1899, Festinger 1954). In the economic domain, happiness research has shown that 
people’s satisfaction depends on their relative income with respect to relevant others rather 
than, or in addition to, their own absolute income level (Luttmer 2005, Clark et al. 2008). In 
recent years, a growing body of experimental evidence indeed demonstrates that people 
compare themselves with others to evaluate their own rewards and that such comparisons 
exert a great influence on decision making (Loewenstein et al. 1989, Fehr & Schmidt 1999, 
Gächter et al. 2012, Brañas-Garza et al. 2014, Corgnet et al. 2015). Neuroscientific research 
also supports these claims insofar as the activity of reward-related brain regions 
(particularly, the ventral striatum) is more responsive to relative than absolute payoffs, at 
least, when social interactions take place in seemingly competitive settings (Fliessbach et 
al. 2007, Dvash et al. 2010, Bault et al. 2011). An important feature of many of the 
aforementioned studies is that effects of social comparisons on well-being and behavior are 
evident even if the individual’s payoff does not depend on the payoff/behavior of the 
referent others (nor vice versa). 
One area where social comparisons appear to play a crucial role is financial risk taking. It 
has been shown that simple information about a counterpart’s outcome can elicit 
“competitive” social emotions such as envy and gloating during risk-taking tasks (Bault et 
al. 2008). Indeed, in environments with cues of social competition, people seem to derive 
intrinsic utility from winning and/or disutility from losing and such social preferences 
dramatically affect decision making (Van den Bos et al. 2008, Sheremeta 2010, Dohmen et 
al. 2011). Notably, these competitive patterns virtually disappear when individuals are 
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paired with non-human, computer opponents (Van den Bos et al. 2008). In the context of 
risk taking in particular, the neurobiological evidence suggests that the more an individual 
is concerned with payoff comparisons (as measured by striatal activity during the outcome 
phase) the more willing to take risks to outcompete her counterpart (Bault et al. 2011; see 
Delgado et al. 2008 and Van den Bos et al. 2013a for similar insights regarding auction 
bidding).  
Importantly, the effects of social comparisons on risk taking have been found in 
experiments where participants interact repeatedly with the same partner(s) (or believe so). 
Yet there are many well-studied cases where social behavior largely depends on whether 
interactions are repeated or not (see for instance Fehr and Fischbacher 2003 and Dal Bó 
2005 with regards to altruistic behavior). Since a sense of rivalry is associated with stronger 
competitive sentiments (Cikara et al. 2011), it might be argued that a repeated setting is 
more likely to elicit rivalry and thus a concern for one’s relative standing than a non-
repeated setting. In other words, an individual might be more motivated to keep up with the 
Joneses (Galí 1994) when her interaction partner is fixed than when encounters are 
sporadic. If this were the case, the influence of social comparisons on risk taking might 
decrease or even vanish in non-repeated interactions. In addition, individuals could learn 
about their opponent’s strategy in repeated but not in non-repeated settings and this may 
also go along with decision-making differences (Van den Bos et al. 2008, Bault et al. 
2011). 
To our knowledge, no study has analyzed whether the impact of social comparisons on 
risk-taking behavior is modulated by the length of the social interaction. Yet two strands of 
research could be relevant in this regard. One concerns the moderating effect that social 
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closeness exerts on social competition. The evidence suggests that people may be even 
more concerned about comparisons when paired with a friend than when paired with a 
stranger (Fareri & Delgado 2014; see also Cobo-Reyes & Jiménez 2012 for similar 
arguments in the context of coordination games). However, friendship involves factors 
other than simply a long history of interactions. There exist a number of important 
variables, such as social identity (van der Bos et al. 2013b), which make it difficult to infer 
whether the differential patterns observed while people compete against close and distant 
others can be partially traced back to the repeated nature of the social relationship.  
The second related research refers to contest experiments, broadly understood as those 
economic experiments in which subjects have to incur irreversible costs to compete for a 
prize. In this case, the role of repeated versus sporadic interactions for bidding behavior has 
been explicitly studied but the results are mixed (see e.g. Herrman & Orzen 2008 and 
Lugovskyy et al. 2010). A recent meta-analysis by Sheremeta (2013) indeed failed to find a 
significant difference in the average level of overbidding (which could be considered as a 
proxy for costly competitive behavior) between fixed and random matching protocols in 
contests. That is, overbidding is observed regardless of whether participants face the same 
(anonymous) opponents for the whole experiment or are instead randomly re-matched in 
every period. Whether this result can be extrapolated to pure risk-taking behavior remains 
unknown. 
In this paper, we study the effect of social comparison information on subjects’ choices 
between risky prospects in a laboratory experiment with real monetary stakes. Participants 
had to make a series of binary choices between two lotteries with varying expected value 
and outcome variance. After each decision, participants were informed of their payoff in 
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that trial. In the next screen, they could compare their payoff to that obtained by another 
agent (who made decisions at the same time than the participant) in the same decision. 
Importantly, the payoffs of the two parties were independent from each other, so that the 
“social feedback” was merely informative. In a between-subjects design, participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three treatments in which we manipulated the nature of the 
social context. Participants were informed that they would be matched with either (i) a 
“virtual participant”, i.e. a computer algorithm (non-social condition), (ii) a different 
human participant selected at random in each trial (social-sporadic condition), or (iii) the 
same human participant for the whole experiment (social-repeated condition). 
Unbeknownst to participants, the other players were simulated in all the three conditions 
and their choices were made by the same algorithm. Thus, the choice of the counterpart in 
each decision did not vary across participants/conditions—although the outcome could 
change since lotteries were played for real in each case (see Methods for further details). 
In sum, if social comparison information exerts an effect on financial risk taking, as 
expected, we should observe behavioral differences between the non-social condition and 
the two social conditions. Specifically, based on the evidence and arguments provided in 
Bault et al. (2011)—as well as results from auction experiments (e.g. Delgado et al. 2008, 
Van der Bos et al. 2008, 2013a)—,we expect subjects to make riskier choices when the 
counterpart is another person than when the counterpart is a computer. In particular, the 
sensitivity to relative social gains is expected to motivate subjects to increase risk taking in 
order to outcompete others. On the other hand, if the impact of social comparisons on risk-
taking behavior is modulated by the repeated versus sporadic nature of the social 
interaction, we should observe differential behaviors in the two social conditions. If that 
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were the case, repetition would be expected to elicit stronger feelings of social competition 
and thus to amplify the effect of social comparisons on risk taking. 
 
Methods 
Participants and procedures. A total of 94 students [Age: M (SD) = 23.04 (1.93)]; gender: 
53% females) of the University of Granada, Spain, participated in the experiment. The 
experiment was conducted in the experimental economics lab GLoBE-EGEO at the School 
of Economics. Participants were recruited using the online system ORSEE (Greiner 2004) 
and were randomly assigned to one of the six experimental sessions. We scheduled two 
sessions of 18 subjects for each condition and conducted the experiments with those who 
showed up on time in each case: non-social, two sessions of 13 subjects each; social-
sporadic, 17 subjects each; social-repeated, 17 subjects each. A Kruskal-Wallis test did not 
yield significant differences between treatments in either age or gender composition 
(p>0.15). At the beginning of each session, participants accessed the lab as they showed 
up. Then, they picked a card from an opaque bag containing the number of their assigned 
cubicle (computer terminal) and proceeded to sit down. The cubicles did not allow visual 
contact among participants. This procedure prevented subjects from figuring out whether 
the number of participants in the session was odd or even, which was particularly important 
in the two social conditions (where subjects were ostensibly paired). Communication 
between participants was not allowed. Sessions lasted for one hour and the mean payment 
in Euros (including a show-up fee of €3) was M (SD)= 10.71 (3.47). The project where this 
experiment is included was approved by the University of Granada Committee on Human 
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Research Ethics (report reference number 2014-911) and all participants provided written 
informed consent prior to participation. 
Risk-taking task. Written instructions were distributed among participants and read aloud 
by the same monitor in every session. Participants made a total of 107 binary choices 
between lotteries (plus 10 practice trials, which were randomly selected from the 107 
possible choices). Each lottery i was given by {(xi1, pi1), (xi2, pi2)} and combined two 
payoffs x from the set {5, 10, 15, 20, 25} (expressed in ECUs: experimental currency units, 
ECU1=€0.50), without repetition, with probabilities p1 and p2=(1-p1) from the set {0.2, 0.5, 
0.8}. From the 432 possible combinations of lotteries, we selected for the experiment only 
those cases where the difference in expected value (EV) between the two lotteries is strictly 
lower than 3 ECUs. This was done in order to reduce the number of trivial decisions. In 
Appendix A, we provide the complete list of lotteries used along with the EV and SD of 
each lottery as well as the equations defining these two variables. Task order was 
randomized across participants.  
In each period, participants were shown two lotteries and had to choose between the left-
hand and right-hand side lottery by pressing N or M, respectively, within a time limit of 
five seconds. This limit was imposed in order to have all participants making their choices 
simultaneously and keep sessions within reasonable time, taking into account that the mean 
response time observed in Bault et al. (2011), where there was no time limit, was below 
four seconds. Failing to make a decision within the time limit led to a zero payoff and the 
written message “Late” was displayed on the screen for 1 sec. (99.66% of all choices were 
on time, which suggest that the time limit does not dramatically affect decision making in 
our task). The payoff for the counterpart was selected in the same way as in the rest of 
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trials, so that the comparison in these few cases was always unfavorable for the participant. 
At the end of the experiment, one decision was randomly chosen for each participant to 
determine the final payment. 
Each trial began with a 500 ms fixation point immediately followed by the presentation of 
the lotteries. For each lottery, the probability corresponding to the smaller payoff was 
displayed by a white bar, while that corresponding to the larger payoff was displayed by a 
(complementary) black bar. The two possible payoffs were displayed at the top of their 
respective probability bars. For instance, in one decision (which was used as example in the 
instructions set, see Appendix B and the screenshot contained in it), participants were asked 
to choose between the “left” lottery offering xL1 = 5 with pL1 = 0.2 and xL2 = 20 with pL2 = 
0.8 (EVL = 17, SDL = 6) and the “right” lottery offering xR1 = 10 with pR1 = 0.5 and xR2 = 25 
with pR2 = 0.5 (EVR = 17.5, SDR = 7.5). In this example, the “right” lottery has higher EV 
but is also riskier (higher SD) than the “left” lottery. After the decision was made, the 
lotteries disappeared from the screen and were not presented again. After a blank interval of 
random duration (between 0 and 3000 ms), the screen showed the outcome of the chosen 
lottery and, just to its right, the payoff not obtained by the participant (i.e. the other possible 
payoff of the chosen lottery) in squared brackets. The two remained simultaneously present 
for 1000 ms. Next, after another blank 0-3000 ms interval, the participant’s payoff was 
presented again, and, just to its right, the payoff obtained by the counterpart (in squared 
brackets). The two were simultaneously present for 1000 ms. Importantly, participants were 
informed that their payoffs and those of their counterpart were independent to each other, 
so that the feedback was merely informative. Finally, there was a blank interval of varying 
10 
 
duration, lasting from the disappearance of the counterpart’s payoff to the onset of the 
following trial (so that the whole trial lasted for exactly 15000 ms). 
To allow for comparability between treatments, the participants’ counterparts were 
simulated in all conditions and chose according to the same algorithm. Note that had we 
used real matching between participants in the two social conditions, we would have ended 
up with a smaller number of independent observations, thus compromising statistical 
inference. Specifically, we would have one independent observation per session in the 
social-sporadic treatment and one independent observation per pair of subjects in the 
social-repeated treatment. Using this method, individuals can be treated as independent 
observations in all cases. As in the “bold environment” of Bault et al. (2011), the 
counterpart was predetermined to choose the lottery with higher expected value in 90% of 
the trials while choosing randomly in the remaining 10% (i.e. the counterpart was basically 
risk-neutral). All lotteries, either chosen by the participant or by the counterpart, were 
played for real in each trial. In contrast to Bault et al. (2011), however, (i) participants were 
neither informed of the outcome of the non-chosen lottery nor were they (directly) 
informed of the lottery chosen by their counterpart and (ii) the outcomes for both parties 
could be different even if they chose the same lottery. This reduced the scope for feelings 
of regret/relief to influence decisions (see e.g. Camille et al. 2004) since the participants did 
not know what the outcome would have been had they chosen the other lottery. In addition, 
reputation formation (e.g. Fehr & Fischbacher 2003) was partly ruled out by the fact that 
the counterpart’s choices were not explicitly provided, so that our results refer to a specific 
case of repeated interactions where reputation is not really at stake.  
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Treatments. We introduced the treatment manipulation at the end of the instructions. In 
particular, the instructions informed participants about the identity of the agent whose 
outcomes they would see in the screen after each decision. In the non-social condition 
(n=26), the counterpart was “a virtual participant (that is, the computer, which makes 
decisions according to a pre-programmed algorithm)”. In the social-sporadic condition 
(n=34), the counterpart was “another participant in this room […] [who] will be chosen at 
random in each of the decisions during this experiment (he/she can be any person of this 
room and he/she will vary in each period)”. In the social-repeated condition (n=34), the 
counterpart was “another participant in this room […] [who] will be the same for all 
decisions during this experiment (he/she can be any person of this room and he/she has 
been chosen at random upon starting)”. In addition, the instructions in the two social 
conditions included the following statement about the counterpart: “He/she will also be 
shown your earnings in each trial in the same way that you see his/hers. Everything is 
anonymous, so you will never know his/her identity, nor he/she will know yours”. An 
English translation of the instructions for each treatment can be found in Appendix B. 
Statistical analysis. Our analyses focus on the aggregate differences between conditions 
(non-social, social-sporadic and social-repeated). Similarly to Bault et al. (2008, 2011), we 
conducted a panel data analysis that takes each participant as the unit and the period as time 
(thus implying a total of 10058 observations: 107 decisions * 94 subjects). Note that there 
were 34 instances (0.34%) in which the choice was not made within the time limit and 
these observations have been excluded from the analyses. We performed conditional fixed-
effects Logit models with the lottery choice as the dependent variable. The fixed-effects 
method controls for any time-invariant personal characteristics of the participants. As 
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within-subject factors we introduced the differences between the two lotteries in terms of 
both expected value (dEV) and standard deviation (dSD). Treatments dummies were 
introduced as between-subjects variables and interacted with dEV and dSD in order to study 
differences between conditions. For convenience, we used the choice of the left-hand side 
lottery as the dependent variable and defined dEV as (EVL minus EVR) and dSD as (SDL 
minus SDR). More specifically, we regressed the likelihood of choosing the “left” lottery 
upon dEV, dSD, and the interaction of the treatment dummies with both dEV and dSD. A 
positive effect of dEV would indicate that subjects choose the lottery with higher expected 
value while a negative/zero/positive effect of dSD indicates that subjects display risk 
averse/neutral/seeking preferences, ceteris paribus (Bault et al. 2008, 2011; note however 
that these measures can suffer from the reliability problems typically associated to 
difference scores and concerns in this regard are thus valid, see for instance Edwards 2001). 
Thus, if there exist between-treatments differences in terms of risk-taking behavior, we 
should observe significant interactions of the treatment dummies with dEV and/or dSD. 
Note that, although between-subjects treatment dummies are by definition time-invariant 
variables and thus cannot be included in a fixed-effects model, the model can include their 
interactions with time-varying (within-subject) factors (see e.g. Allison 2009). This allows 
us to reliably estimate whether the effects of the within-subject factors on the dependent 
variable differ across treatments. Analyses were performed with Stata statistical software 
version 10.1 (Stata Corporation). For the sake of readability exact values of regression 
coefficients (b) and standard errors (SE; z-statistics are given by b/SE) will be displayed in 
tables. Only p-values are reported in the main text. 
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Results 
Social vs. non-social comparisons 
As shown in column (1) of Table 1, where treatment effects were not considered, on 
average our subjects chose the lottery with higher EV (p<0.01) and lower SD (p<0.01), all 
else equal, indicating risk aversion. In column (2), we introduced the dummy variable 
“social”, that takes the value of 1 for subjects in either of the two social conditions (0 for 
subjects in the non-social condition), and its interactions with dEV and dSD. This method 
allowed us to check whether subjects were more or less sensitive to the differences in EV 
and SD between the lotteries in the social than in the non-social environment. The two 
interaction terms were significant. Specifically, compared to the subjects in the non-social 
condition, subjects in the social conditions chose lotteries with lower EV (p<0.01) and 
higher SD (p=0.03). In order to alleviate concerns related with the use of difference scores 
(Edwards 2001), we performed the same regression but, instead of dEV and dSD, we 
introduced EVL, EVR, SDL and SDR, and their respective interactions with “social”: Wald 
tests comparing EVL X social vs. EVR X social and SDL X social vs. SDR X social report 
significance levels virtually identical to those obtained for the aforementioned interactions 
dEV X social and dSD X social, respectively (this similarity between the two statistical 
approaches also holds for the remaining analyses of this paper; the results using the 
alternative method are available upon request from the authors). This indicates that social 
comparison information led to less profitable and riskier decision making. Yet, Wald tests 
on the interaction coefficients report that dEV and dSD still yield positive and negative 
effects, respectively, on the likelihood of choosing the “left” lottery for subjects belonging 
to the social conditions (dEV: b=0.644, p<0.01; dSD: b=-0.041, p<0.01). Therefore, 
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subjects in the social conditions also displayed risk aversion, although weaker in 
comparison to subjects in the non-social environment. 
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the strength of these effects. Due to the 
complex interpretation of marginal effects of interactions in non-linear models (Ai & 
Norton 2003), we plot the predictions of a fixed-effects linear probability model 
(significance levels are nearly identical to those obtained with the logistic model; see also 
Espín et al. 2012). The (linear) predicted likelihood of choosing the “left” lottery is plotted 
as a function of dEV and dSD, separately for the social and non-social conditions. For 
visual clarity, both dEV and dSD are split into three categories (which roughly correspond 
to the terciles of the distribution). It can be observed that, for each category of dEV, the 
likelihood of choosing the “left” lottery decreases as dSD increases, but that this negative 
relationship is weaker in the social conditions compared to the non-social condition. 
Similarly, for each category of dSD, the likelihood of choosing the “left” lottery increases 
with dEV but this effect is also less pronounced in the social environment than in the non-
social one. 
------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------- 
------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------- 
An appealing measure of the relative variability of risky choice alternatives is given by the 
coefficient of variation, which computes risk per unit of return (Weber et al. 2004): CV = 
SD/EV. Following the same approach as before, we defined dCV = CVL-CVR. When using 
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dCV, instead of both dEV and dSD, as the explanatory variable, the results point to the same 
direction. On average, subjects chose the lottery with lower CV (column 3, p<0.01) but the 
interaction between dDV and the “social” dummy is positive and significant (column 4, 
p=0.04). This indicates that subjects in the two social conditions were more risky (per unit 
of return) than those in the non-social condition, thus confirming the above results. 
However, a Wald test reports that subjects in the social conditions still chose the lotteries 
with lower CV (b=-0.664, p<0.01). 
 
Sporadic vs. Repeated social interactions 
In Table 2, we report regressions where we disentangle between the two social conditions, 
namely the social-sporadic and social-repeated treatments. We added interactions between 
the two treatment dummies (non-social is used as the comparison group) and the risk-
related variables to the models in order to explore between-treatment differences. Column 
(1) shows that the interaction of both treatment dummies with dEV and dSD yield 
significant estimates. Specifically, compared to the non-social condition, subjects in either 
the social-sporadic (p=0.03) or the social-repeated treatment (p<0.01) chose prospects 
with lower EV. With regards to SD, subjects took more risks in the either the social-
sporadic (p=0.04) or the social-repeated treatment (p=0.08) than in the non-social 
treatment, although the latter effect is only marginally significant. (Note that obtaining 
higher p-values in the models of Table 2 than in those of Table 1 is reasonable if we take 
into account that the number of observations for which a treatment dummy takes the value 
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of 1 is now smaller.) As before, regardless of the condition, subjects exhibited risk aversion 
(Wald tests, ps<0.01).  
A Wald test comparing the coefficients of the interactions of both treatment dummies with 
dEV reveals no significant differences between the two social conditions (p=0.25). Non-
significant differences are also found in terms of risk aversion (dSD) between the two social 
conditions (p=0.73). Note that following different approaches (as there is no standard 
method for power analysis in fixed-effects Logit), the minimum sample size required in 
each treatment for these two differences to become significant at 5% with a power of 0.80 
is never found to be lower than n=160 and n=2200, respectively. Thus, we may conclude 
that the effect of social comparison information on decision making under uncertainty does 
not depend on whether interactions are repeated or sporadic. Linear predictions are 
displayed in Figure 2 using the same format of Figure 1. It can be observed that the effects 
of dEV and dSD on the likelihood of choosing the “left” lottery are virtually identical in the 
two social conditions. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the impact of dCV on choices. 
Column (2) displays the estimates of a model in which the treatment dummies are 
interacted with dCV. The interactions of dCV with the social-sporadic (p=0.07) and the 
social-repeated (p=0.08) dummies yield marginally significant coefficients. Again, Wald 
tests confirm that subjects chose the lotteries with lower CV, regardless of the condition 
they belong to (ps<0.01), and that there is no difference between the two social conditions 
with regards to the effect of dCV on choices (p=0.92). 
-------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
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--------------- 
--------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
----------------- 
 
Discussion 
We have shown that subjects in the social conditions chose lotteries with higher variance 
compared to subjects in the non-social environment. This evidence indicates that social 
comparison information leads to riskier financial decisions, as hypothesized. Our data also 
reveal a negative effect of social comparison information on the subjects’ sensitivity to 
expected returns, thus leading to less profitable choices, ceteris paribus. Please note that we 
had no ex-ante prediction for the latter relationship, so that we can only offer an ex-post 
explanation. One possible reason why social comparisons are associated with poorer 
decision making in our experiment relies on the hypothesis that the social environment 
involves higher emotional arousal than the non-social environment. That is, the competitive 
emotions that are elicited by social comparisons (i.e. envy and gloating; see Bault et al. 
2008, Dvash et al. 2010) might interfere with the individuals’ cognitive capacity to choose 
lotteries that maximize expected returns. Previous evidence suggests that the capacity to 
exert top-down control on emotional processing is associated with return sensitivity in risk-
taking tasks (e.g. van Duijvenvoorde et al. 2015). Taking together the results regarding 
expected returns and risk taking, indeed, one might wonder whether individuals under 
social conditions become less sensitive to both factors (dEV and dSD), thus leading to 
choices that are less beneficial and less risk averse. Furthermore, it may also be argued that 
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the time limit imposed on subjects’ decisions in our task has amplified this effect by 
reducing subjects’ capacity to exert cognitive control (see for instance Rand et al. 2012 in 
the context of social cooperation) or by increasing their need for cognitive closure (e.g. 
Webster & Kruglanski 1994). Although our data as well as those from Bault et al. (2011) 
suggest that the implemented five-second limit should not have a strong effect (see 
Methods), this is an interesting hypothesis to be tested in future research.  
In addition, the effects we find might have partly to do with the fact that one’s own 
outcomes are observed by another person (instead of pure social comparison effects). 
However, our design does not allow us to test the extent to which simply being observed by 
others can account for the current results and further research should thus explore this 
possibility. 
Our results, therefore, suggest that mere information about the outcomes of a human 
counterpart leads to riskier and less profitable lottery choices compared to when the 
counterpart is a computer. Importantly, the data indicate that these effects of social 
comparisons on financial risk taking do not depend on whether the human counterpart is 
encountered repeatedly or sporadically: the only crucial information is that s/he is another 
human. In this vein, these findings do not support the hypothesis that repetition alone leads 
to increased feelings of social competition (through increased rivalry or other channels) 
and, consequently, exacerbate the impact of social comparison information on risk-taking 
behavior. In other words, the fact that the “Joneses” are encountered repeatedly or not does 
not appear to influence whether individuals modify their decision making in order to “keep 
up with them”. Our results are therefore in line with previous evidence from contest 
experiments, where the level of overbidding has been found to be similar in random- and 
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fixed-matching protocols (Sheremeta 2013). Note however that, as mentioned, real-life 
long-term relationships typically involve factors other than simple repeated interactions, 
such as reputation concerns (Fehr & Fischbacher 2003), social closeness (Fareri & Delgado 
2014) or identity issues (van der Bos et al. 2013b). In this vein, our results are limited to the 
pure effect of repetition on decision making under uncertainty. Future research should 
examine whether the effect of repeated interaction on risk-taking behavior may be 
modulated or mediated by these factors.  
From the applied point of view, our results may have interesting implications for the 
functioning of financial markets. In environments such as the stock market, where 
information about others’ outcomes is by definition present since prices reflect others’ 
gains/losses (and possibly more so in “high-frequency” trading, where decisions are made 
quickly), choices may be poorer and riskier than they would be if social comparison 
information were absent. Therefore, regulatory interventions on the way information is 
presented to decision makers could be effective in modifying these patterns to the extent 
that implicit cues of social competition are somewhat mitigated. Yet our results suggest that 
the effects of social comparisons cannot be modulated by manipulating the number of times 
traders interact with each other on the floor. One limitation of our study is that the task did 
not allow subjects to incur losses, which are however often involved in real-life financial 
decisions. Thus it would be important for future research to analyze whether our findings 
can be extended to risk taking in the losses domain. 
20 
 
References 
Ai, C., & Norton, E. C. (2003). Interaction terms in logit and probit models. 
Economics Letters, 80(1), 123-129. DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00032-6 
Allison, P. D. (2009). Fixed Effects Regression Models (Quantitative Applications 
in the Social Sciences, Vol. 160). Thousand Oaks, CA (US): SAGE publications. 
Bault, N., Coricelli, G., & Rustichini, A. (2008). Interdependent utilities: how social 
ranking affects choice behavior. PloS One, 3(10), e3477. DOI: 
10.1371/journal.pone.0003477 
Bault, N., Joffily, M., Rustichini, A., & Coricelli, G. (2011). Medial prefrontal 
cortex and striatum mediate the influence of social comparison on the decision process. 
Proceedings of the national Academy of Sciences, 108(38), 16044-16049. DOI: 
10.1073/pnas.1100892108 
Brañas-Garza, P., Espín, A. M., Exadaktylos, F., & Herrmann, B. (2014). Fair and 
unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game. Scientific Reports, 4, 6025. DOI: 
10.1038/srep06025 
Camille, N., Coricelli, G., Sallet, J., Pradat-Diehl, P., Duhamel, J. R., & Sirigu, A. 
(2004). The involvement of the orbitofrontal cortex in the experience of regret. Science, 
304(5674), 1167-1170. DOI: 10.1126/science.1094550 
Cikara, M., Botvinick, M. M., & Fiske, S. T. (2011). Us versus them social identity 
shapes neural responses to intergroup competition and harm. Psychological Science, 22(3), 
306-313. DOI: 10.1177/0956797610397667 
21 
 
Clark, A. E., Frijters, P., & Shields, M. A. (2008). Relative income, happiness, and 
utility: an explanation for the Easterlin paradox and other puzzles. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 46(1), 95-144. DOI: 10.1257/jel.46.1.95 
Cobo-Reyes, R., & Jiménez, N. (2012). The dark side of friendship: ‘envy’. 
Experimental Economics, 15(4), 547-570. DOI: 10.1007/s10683-012-9313-0 
Corgnet, B., Espín, A. M., & Hernán-González, R. (2015). The cognitive basis of 
social behavior: cognitive reflection overrides antisocial but not always prosocial motives. 
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 9(287). DOI: 10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00287 
Dal Bó, P. (2005). Cooperation under the shadow of the future: experimental 
evidence from infinitely repeated games. American Economic Review, 95(5), 1591-1604. 
DOI: 10.3886/ICPSR34573.v1 
Delgado, M. R., Schotter, A., Ozbay, E. Y., & Phelps, E. A. (2008). Understanding 
overbidding: using the neural circuitry of reward to design economic auctions. Science, 
321(5897), 1849-1852. DOI: 10.1126/science.1158860 
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Fliessbach, K., Sunde, U., & Weber, B. (2011). Relative 
versus absolute income, joy of winning, and gender: Brain imaging evidence. Journal of 
Public Economics, 95(3), 279-285. DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.025 
Dvash, J., Gilam, G., Ben-Ze'ev, A., Hendler, T., & Shamay-Tsoory, S. G. (2010). 
The envious brain: the neural basis of social comparison. Human Brain Mapping, 31(11), 
1741-1750. DOI: 10.1002/hbm.20972. 
22 
 
Edwards, J. R. (2001). Ten difference score myths. Organizational Research 
Methods, 4(3), 265-287. 
Espín, A. M., Brañas-Garza, P., Herrmann, B., & Gamella, J. F. (2012). Patient and 
impatient punishers of free-riders. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 
279(1749), 4923-4928. DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2012.2043 
Fareri, D. S., & Delgado, M. R. (2014). Differential reward responses during 
competition against in-and out-of-network others. Social Cognitive and Affective 
Neuroscience, 9(4), 412-420. DOI: 10.1093/scan/nst006 
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003). The nature of human altruism. Nature, 
425(6960), 785-791. DOI: 10.1038/nature02043 
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and 
cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), 817-868. DOI: 
10.1162/003355399556151 
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human relations, 
7(2), 117-140. DOI: 10.1177/001872675400700202 
Fliessbach, K., Weber, B., Trautner, P., Dohmen, T., Sunde, U., Elger, C. E., & 
Falk, A. (2007). Social comparison affects reward-related brain activity in the human 
ventral striatum. Science, 318(5854), 1305-1308. DOI: 10.1126/science.1145876 
Gächter, S., Nosenzo, D., & Sefton, M. (2012). The Impact of Social Comparisons 
on Reciprocity. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 114(4), 1346-1367. DOI: 
10.1111/j.1467-9442.2012.01730.x 
23 
 
Gali, J. (1994). Keeping up with the Joneses: consumption externalities, portfolio 
choice, and asset prices. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 26(1), 1-8. DOI: 
DOI:10.2307/2078030 
Greiner, B. (2004). An online recruitment system for economic experiments. In 
Forschung und Wissenschaftliches Rechnen GWDG Bericht 63 [Research and Scientific 
Computation GWDG Report 63], ed. K. Kremer, and V. Macho. Göttingen (Germany): 
Gesellschaft für Wissenschaftliche Datenverarbeitung.  
Herrmann, B., & Orzen, H. (2008). The appearance of homo rivalis: social 
preferences and the nature of rent seeking. CeDEx Discussion Paper Series (#2008-10). 
Available at (May 12
th
, 2015): http://nottingham.ac.uk/cedex/documents/papers/2008-
10.pdf 
Loewenstein, G. F., Thompson, L., & Bazerman, M. H. (1989). Social utility and 
decision making in interpersonal contexts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
57(3), 426-441. DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.57.3.426  
Lugovskyy, V., Puzzello, D., & Tucker, S. (2010). An experimental investigation of 
overdissipation in the all pay auction. European Economic Review, 54(8), 974-997. DOI: 
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2010.02.006 
Luttmer, E. F. (2005). Neighbors as negatives: relative earnings and well-being. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(3), 963-1002. DOI: 10.3386/w10667 
Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D. and Nowak, M. A. (2012). Spontaneous giving and 
calculated greed. Nature, 489(7416), 427-430. DOI: 10.1038/nature11467 
24 
 
Sheremeta, R. M. (2010). Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage 
contests. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(2), 731-747. DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.001 
Sheremeta, R. M. (2013). Overbidding and heterogeneous behavior in contest 
experiments. Journal of Economic Surveys, 27(3), 491-514. DOI: 10.1111/joes.12022 
van den Bos, W., Golka, P. J., Effelsberg, D., & McClure, S. M. (2013b). Pyrrhic 
victories: the need for social status drives costly competitive behavior. Frontiers in 
Neuroscience, 7, 189. DOI: 10.3389/fnins.2013.00189 
van den Bos, W., Li, J., Lau, T., Maskin, E., Cohen, J. D., Montague, P. R., & 
McClure, S. M. (2008). The value of victory: social origins of the winner's curse in 
common value auctions. Judgment and Decision Making, 3(7), 483. 
van den Bos, W., Talwar, A., & McClure, S. M. (2013a). Neural correlates of 
reinforcement learning and social preferences in competitive bidding. The Journal of 
Neuroscience, 33(5), 2137-2146. DOI: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3095-12.2013 
van Duijvenvoorde, A. C., Huizenga, H. M., Somerville, L. H., Delgado, M. R., 
Powers, A., Weeda, W. D., ... & Figner, B. (2015). Neural correlates of expected risks and 
returns in risky choice across development. The Journal of Neuroscience, 35(4), 1549-
1560. DOI: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1924-14.2015 
Veblen, T. (1899). The Theory of the Leisure Class. New York, NY (US): The New 
American Library.  
Webster, D. M., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1994). Individual differences in need for 
cognitive closure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(6), 1049-1062. 
25 
 
Table 1. The effect of social comparisons on lottery choice 
 
 
Regression models 
Choice predictors (1) (2) (3) (4) 
dEV 0.677*** 0.763*** 
  
 
(0.017) (0.033) 
  dSD -0.051*** -0.076*** 
  
 
(0.007) (0.014) 
  dEV X social 
 
-0.119*** 
  
  
(0.038) 
  dSD X social 
 
0.035** 
  
  
(0.016) 
  dCV 
  
-0.772*** -1.042*** 
   
(0.084) (0.159) 
dCV X social 
   
0.378** 
    
(0.187) 
2 1991.871*** 2004.915*** 84.822*** 88.903*** 
ll -5074.674 -5068.151 -6028.198 -6026.158 
N 10024 10024 10024 10024 
 
Notes: Estimates from conditional fixed-effects logistic regressions (groups: individuals; mean 
observations per group: 106.6). The models estimate the likelihood of choosing the “left” lottery as a 
function of dSD (SDL-SDR) and dEV (EVL-EVR) in columns (1)-(2), and as a function of dCV (CVL-
CVR) in columns (3)-(4). Interactions of “social” condition with dSD and dEV are included in 
column (2), and with dCV in column (4). In column (2), the coefficients of dEV and dSD refer to 
their effects within the non-social condition, while their effects within the social condition are given 
by the combined coefficients “dEV + dEV X social” and “dSD + dSD X social”, respectively. In 
column (4), the coefficient of dCV refers to its effect within the non-social condition, while its effect 
within the social condition is given by the combined coefficient “dCV + dCV X social”. Standard 
errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 2. The effect of repeated (vs. sporadic) social interactions on lottery choice 
 
Regression models 
Choice predictors (1) (2) 
dEV 0.763*** 
 
 
(0.033) 
 dSD -0.076*** 
 
 
(0.014) 
 dEV X social-sporadic -0.096** 
 
 
(0.044) 
 dEV X social-repeated -0.142*** 
 
 
(0.043) 
 dSD X social-sporadic 0.037** 
 
 
(0.018) 
 dSD X social-repeated 0.032* 
 
 
(0.018) 
 dCV 
 
-1.042*** 
  
(0.159) 
dCV X social-sporadic 
 
0.387* 
  
(0.212) 
dCV X social-repeated 
 
0.368* 
  
(0.212) 
2 2006.430*** 88.912*** 
ll -5067.394 -6026.153 
N 10024 10024 
 
Notes: Estimates from conditional fixed-effects logistic regressions (groups: individuals; 
mean observations per group: 106.6). The models estimate the likelihood of choosing the 
“left” lottery as a function of dSD, dEV and their interactions with “social-sporadic” and 
“social-repeated” conditions in column (1), and as a function of dCV and its interactions 
with “social-sporadic” and “social-repeated” conditions in column (2). The baseline group 
is “non-social”. See notes on Table 1 for the interpretation of coefficients. Standard errors 
in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. The effect of social comparisons on lottery choice. Predicted likelihood of 
choosing the “left” lottery as a function of dSD (SDL-SDR: 3 categories) and dEV (EVL-
EVR: 3 categories), broken down by social vs. non-social conditions. 
Figure 2. The effect of repeated (vs. sporadic) social interactions on lottery choice. 
Predicted likelihood of choosing the “left” lottery as a function of dSD (SDL-SDR: 3 
categories) and dEV (EVL-EVR: 3 categories), broken down by condition. 
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Figure 1 
 
Figure 2 
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APPENDIX A 
The risk-taking task 
The expected value (EV) of a given lottery is defined as: 
 
The standard deviation (SD) of a given lottery is defined as: 
 
The table below provides the complete list of lotteries used: 
LOTTERY 1   LOTTERY 2   
  
x1 p1 x2 p2 EV SD   x1 p1 x2 p2 EV SD   dEV dSD 
5 0.2 10 0.8 9 2   5 0.5 10 0.5 7.5 2.5   1.5 -0.5 
5 0.2 10 0.8 9 2   5 0.5 15 0.5 10 5   -1 -3 
5 0.2 10 0.8 9 2   5 0.8 15 0.2 7 4   2 -2 
5 0.2 10 0.8 9 2   5 0.8 20 0.2 8 6   1 -4 
5 0.2 10 0.8 9 2   5 0.8 25 0.2 9 8   0 -6 
5 0.2 10 0.8 9 2   10 0.8 15 0.2 11 2   -2 0 
5 0.5 10 0.5 7.5 2.5   5 0.8 10 0.2 6 2   1.5 0.5 
5 0.5 10 0.5 7.5 2.5   5 0.5 15 0.5 10 5   -2.5 -2.5 
5 0.5 10 0.5 7.5 2.5   5 0.8 15 0.2 7 4   0.5 -1.5 
5 0.5 10 0.5 7.5 2.5   5 0.8 20 0.2 8 6   -0.5 -3.5 
5 0.5 10 0.5 7.5 2.5   5 0.8 25 0.2 9 8   -1.5 -5.5 
5 0.8 10 0.2 6 2   5 0.8 15 0.2 7 4   -1 -2 
5 0.8 10 0.2 6 2   5 0.8 20 0.2 8 6   -2 -4 
5 0.2 15 0.8 13 4   5 0.5 20 0.5 12.5 7.5   0.5 -3.5 
5 0.2 15 0.8 13 4   5 0.5 25 0.5 15 10   -2 -6 
5 0.2 15 0.8 13 4   10 0.2 15 0.8 14 2   -1 2 
5 0.2 15 0.8 13 4   10 0.5 15 0.5 12.5 2.5   0.5 1.5 
5 0.2 15 0.8 13 4   10 0.8 15 0.2 11 2   2 2 
5 0.2 15 0.8 13 4   10 0.5 20 0.5 15 5   -2 -1 
5 0.2 15 0.8 13 4   10 0.8 20 0.2 12 4   1 0 
5 0.2 15 0.8 13 4   10 0.8 25 0.2 13 6   0 -2 
5 0.5 15 0.5 10 5   5 0.5 20 0.5 12.5 7.5   -2.5 -2.5 
5 0.5 15 0.5 10 5   5 0.8 20 0.2 8 6   2 -1 
5 0.5 15 0.5 10 5   5 0.8 25 0.2 9 8   1 -3 
5 0.5 15 0.5 10 5   10 0.5 15 0.5 12.5 2.5   -2.5 2.5 
5 0.5 15 0.5 10 5   10 0.8 15 0.2 11 2   -1 3 
5 0.5 15 0.5 10 5   10 0.8 20 0.2 12 4   -2 1 
5 0.8 15 0.2 7 4   5 0.8 20 0.2 8 6   -1 -2 
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5 0.8 15 0.2 7 4   5 0.8 25 0.2 9 8   -2 -4 
5 0.2 20 0.8 17 6   5 0.5 25 0.5 15 10   2 -4 
5 0.2 20 0.8 17 6   10 0.2 20 0.8 18 4   -1 2 
5 0.2 20 0.8 17 6   10 0.5 20 0.5 15 5   2 1 
5 0.2 20 0.8 17 6   10 0.5 25 0.5 17.5 7.5   -0.5 -1.5 
5 0.2 20 0.8 17 6   15 0.2 20 0.8 19 2   -2 4 
5 0.2 20 0.8 17 6   15 0.5 20 0.5 17.5 2.5   -0.5 3.5 
5 0.2 20 0.8 17 6   15 0.8 20 0.2 16 2   1 4 
5 0.2 20 0.8 17 6   15 0.8 25 0.2 17 4   0 2 
5 0.5 20 0.5 12.5 7.5   5 0.5 25 0.5 15 10   -2.5 -2.5 
5 0.5 20 0.5 12.5 7.5   10 0.2 15 0.8 14 2   -1.5 5.5 
5 0.5 20 0.5 12.5 7.5   10 0.5 15 0.5 12.5 2.5   0 5 
5 0.5 20 0.5 12.5 7.5   10 0.8 15 0.2 11 2   1.5 5.5 
5 0.5 20 0.5 12.5 7.5   10 0.5 20 0.5 15 5   -2.5 2.5 
5 0.5 20 0.5 12.5 7.5   10 0.8 20 0.2 12 4   0.5 3.5 
5 0.5 20 0.5 12.5 7.5   10 0.8 25 0.2 13 6   -0.5 1.5 
5 0.8 20 0.2 8 6   5 0.8 25 0.2 9 8   -1 -2 
5 0.2 25 0.8 21 8   10 0.2 25 0.8 22 6   -1 2 
5 0.2 25 0.8 21 8   15 0.2 20 0.8 19 2   2 6 
5 0.2 25 0.8 21 8   15 0.2 25 0.8 23 4   -2 4 
5 0.2 25 0.8 21 8   15 0.5 25 0.5 20 5   1 3 
5 0.2 25 0.8 21 8   20 0.5 25 0.5 22.5 2.5   -1.5 5.5 
5 0.2 25 0.8 21 8   20 0.8 25 0.2 21 2   0 6 
5 0.5 25 0.5 15 10   10 0.2 15 0.8 14 2   1 8 
5 0.5 25 0.5 15 10   10 0.5 15 0.5 12.5 2.5   2.5 7.5 
5 0.5 25 0.5 15 10   10 0.5 20 0.5 15 5   0 5 
5 0.5 25 0.5 15 10   10 0.5 25 0.5 17.5 7.5   -2.5 2.5 
5 0.5 25 0.5 15 10   10 0.8 25 0.2 13 6   2 4 
5 0.5 25 0.5 15 10   15 0.5 20 0.5 17.5 2.5   -2.5 7.5 
5 0.5 25 0.5 15 10   15 0.8 20 0.2 16 2   -1 8 
5 0.5 25 0.5 15 10   15 0.8 25 0.2 17 4   -2 6 
5 0.8 25 0.2 9 8   10 0.8 15 0.2 11 2   -2 6 
10 0.2 15 0.8 14 2   10 0.5 15 0.5 12.5 2.5   1.5 -0.5 
10 0.2 15 0.8 14 2   10 0.5 20 0.5 15 5   -1 -3 
10 0.2 15 0.8 14 2   10 0.8 20 0.2 12 4   2 -2 
10 0.2 15 0.8 14 2   10 0.8 25 0.2 13 6   1 -4 
10 0.2 15 0.8 14 2   15 0.8 20 0.2 16 2   -2 0 
10 0.5 15 0.5 12.5 2.5   10 0.8 15 0.2 11 2   1.5 0.5 
10 0.5 15 0.5 12.5 2.5   10 0.5 20 0.5 15 5   -2.5 -2.5 
10 0.5 15 0.5 12.5 2.5   10 0.8 20 0.2 12 4   0.5 -1.5 
10 0.5 15 0.5 12.5 2.5   10 0.8 25 0.2 13 6   -0.5 -3.5 
10 0.8 15 0.2 11 2   10 0.8 20 0.2 12 4   -1 -2 
10 0.8 15 0.2 11 2   10 0.8 25 0.2 13 6   -2 -4 
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10 0.2 20 0.8 18 4   10 0.5 25 0.5 17.5 7.5   0.5 -3.5 
10 0.2 20 0.8 18 4   15 0.2 20 0.8 19 2   -1 2 
10 0.2 20 0.8 18 4   15 0.5 20 0.5 17.5 2.5   0.5 1.5 
10 0.2 20 0.8 18 4   15 0.8 20 0.2 16 2   2 2 
10 0.2 20 0.8 18 4   15 0.5 25 0.5 20 5   -2 -1 
10 0.2 20 0.8 18 4   15 0.8 25 0.2 17 4   1 0 
10 0.5 20 0.5 15 5   10 0.5 25 0.5 17.5 7.5   -2.5 -2.5 
10 0.5 20 0.5 15 5   10 0.8 25 0.2 13 6   2 -1 
10 0.5 20 0.5 15 5   15 0.5 20 0.5 17.5 2.5   -2.5 2.5 
10 0.5 20 0.5 15 5   15 0.8 20 0.2 16 2   -1 3 
10 0.5 20 0.5 15 5   15 0.8 25 0.2 17 4   -2 1 
10 0.8 20 0.2 12 4   10 0.8 25 0.2 13 6   -1 -2 
10 0.2 25 0.8 22 6   15 0.2 25 0.8 23 4   -1 2 
10 0.2 25 0.8 22 6   15 0.5 25 0.5 20 5   2 1 
10 0.2 25 0.8 22 6   20 0.2 25 0.8 24 2   -2 4 
10 0.2 25 0.8 22 6   20 0.5 25 0.5 22.5 2.5   -0.5 3.5 
10 0.2 25 0.8 22 6   20 0.8 25 0.2 21 2   1 4 
10 0.5 25 0.5 17.5 7.5   15 0.2 20 0.8 19 2   -1.5 5.5 
10 0.5 25 0.5 17.5 7.5   15 0.5 20 0.5 17.5 2.5   0 5 
10 0.5 25 0.5 17.5 7.5   15 0.8 20 0.2 16 2   1.5 5.5 
10 0.5 25 0.5 17.5 7.5   15 0.5 25 0.5 20 5   -2.5 2.5 
10 0.5 25 0.5 17.5 7.5   15 0.8 25 0.2 17 4   0.5 3.5 
15 0.2 20 0.8 19 2   15 0.5 20 0.5 17.5 2.5   1.5 -0.5 
15 0.2 20 0.8 19 2   15 0.5 25 0.5 20 5   -1 -3 
15 0.2 20 0.8 19 2   15 0.8 25 0.2 17 4   2 -2 
15 0.2 20 0.8 19 2   20 0.8 25 0.2 21 2   -2 0 
15 0.5 20 0.5 17.5 2.5   15 0.8 20 0.2 16 2   1.5 0.5 
15 0.5 20 0.5 17.5 2.5   15 0.5 25 0.5 20 5   -2.5 -2.5 
15 0.5 20 0.5 17.5 2.5   15 0.8 25 0.2 17 4   0.5 -1.5 
15 0.2 25 0.8 23 4   20 0.2 25 0.8 24 2   -1 2 
15 0.2 25 0.8 23 4   20 0.5 25 0.5 22.5 2.5   0.5 1.5 
15 0.2 25 0.8 23 4   20 0.8 25 0.2 21 2   2 2 
15 0.5 25 0.5 20 5   20 0.5 25 0.5 22.5 2.5   -2.5 2.5 
15 0.5 25 0.5 20 5   20 0.8 25 0.2 21 2   -1 3 
20 0.2 25 0.8 24 2   20 0.5 25 0.5 22.5 2.5   1.5 -0.5 
20 0.5 25 0.5 22.5 2.5   20 0.8 25 0.2 21 2   1.5 0.5 
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APPENDIX B 
Instructions (Non-social condition). The complete instructions for the non-social 
condition were as follows. 
Welcome to this experiment on decision making. Thank you for participating. 
In this experiment you can win an amount of money that depends on the decisions 
you will make next. You will be asked to make a total of 107 decisions. Note that 
there are no right or wrong decisions; you are simply asked to respond according to 
your preferences. 
In every trial, you will be asked to choose between two lotteries, each one assigning 
probabilities to two possible monetary gains (prizes). Choosing a lottery implies 
actually playing it. 
Earnings are expressed in "u" (experimental currency units). Each "u" is equivalent 
to 50 cents, that is 2u = 1€. At the end of the experiment, your earnings will be 
converted to Euros and will be paid in real money, upon 3€ you will receive for 
participating. 
You will receive the real monetary payment corresponding to one and only one 
decision, randomly selected by the computer among the 107 decisions you actually 
made, at the end of the experiment. Your task is thus to choose the lottery you 
prefer in each case, independently of whatever you chose in the previous ones, 
provided that only one of them will count for the final payment. 
The instructions are: 
In each trial/decision, the screen will show two lotteries. You will have to decide 
whether you prefer the left- or the right-hand side lottery by pressing the button: 
N (left) or M (right) 
You have 5 seconds to make your decision. If you take longer, the message "LATE" 
will appear on the screen and your gain associated with that decision will be 0u. 
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Lotteries will be presented on the screen as shown in the following figure: 
 
 
Each lottery has two possible prizes, one smaller and one larger, each with an 
associated probability. These probabilities can be: 
20%, 50% or 80%. 
For each lottery, the probability of winning the smaller prize is indicated by a white 
bar just below that prize. Likewise, a black bar indicates the probability of winning 
the larger prize. The probability of getting the larger price is always the complement 
of the probability of obtaining the smaller one. Therefore, the longer the white bar, 
the more likely you are to get the smaller prize. And the longer the black bar, the 
more likely you are to get the larger prize. 
In the example displayed in the figure, the left lottery’s smaller prize is 5u, and its 
associated probability is 20%, therefore the probability of getting the larger prize 
(20u) is 80%. On the right lottery, the smaller prize is 10u and its probability 50%, 
so the probability of getting the larger prize (25u) is also 50%. 
Once you decide which lottery you want to play by pressing N (left) or M (right), 
the computer will actually run it, and will calculate the prize according to the 
specified probabilities. In short, in the example in the figure, if you choose the left 
lottery (pressing N), you will have a 20% chance of getting 5u and 80% chance of 
getting 20u. If you choose the right lottery (pressing M), you will have a 50% 
chance of getting 10u and 50% chance of getting 25u. 
Upon choosing, the selected lottery will be highlighted with a red square. The prize 
corresponding to the outcome of that lottery will be shown shortly afterwards. The 
value of the prize will appear written in red on the center of the screen. Just to its 
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right, in squared brackets, you will be also shown the prize you did not get from the 
same lottery. For example, if you choose the left lottery and it turns out that your 
prize is 5u, the result will be displayed as follows: 
5 [20] 
namely, prize won [prize not won] 
Once you have seen the prize won, and the prize not won, resulting from your 
choice, a second message in blue will appear in the center of the screen. This 
message will show again the prize you have won and, right next to it, in 
squared brackets, the prize won by a virtual participant (that is, the computer, 
which makes decisions according to a pre-programmed algorithm) in that 
same decision. Therefore, if you have obtained 5u and the virtual counterpart has 
obtained 10u, you will see a message like this: 
5 [10] 
namely, the prize you won [the prize won by the computer] 
This message is only informative, since the computer’s winnings have not any 
influence on your winnings. The computer will have made its choice between the 
same two lotteries as you, according to its programmed algorithm. Finally, 
remember that you will receive payment in real money corresponding to one 
decision and only one, randomly selected by the computer at the end of the 
experiment. Thus, your task is to choose the lottery you prefer in every decision, 
regardless of your choice in the other trials, because only one of them will finally 
count for the actual payment. 
GOOD LUCK! 
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Instructions (social conditions): Instructions in the social conditions were mostly 
equivalent to the ones above, except for the last two paragraphs. In the social-sporadic 
condition, the corresponding text read as follows. 
 Once you have seen the prize won, and the prize not won, resulting from your 
choice, a second message in blue will appear in the center of the screen. This 
message will show again the prize you have won and, right next to it, in 
squared brackets, the prize won by another participant in this room on the 
same decision. Therefore, if you have obtained 5u and the other participant has 
obtained 10u, you will see a message like this 
5 [10] 
namely, the prize you won [the prize won by the other participant] 
This message is only informative, since the other person’s winnings have no 
influence on your winnings. The person whose earnings you will see in blue 
brackets will be chosen at random in each of the decisions during this 
experiment (he/she can be any person of this room and he/she will vary in each 
period). This person will have played the same lotteries at the same time as you. 
He/she will also be shown your earnings in each trial, in the same way that you see 
his/hers. Everything is anonymous, so you will never know his/her identity, nor 
he/she will know yours. Finally, remember that you will receive payment in real 
money corresponding to one decision and only one, randomly selected by the 
computer at the end of the experiment. Thus, your task is to choose the lottery you 
prefer in every decision, regardless of your choice in the other trials, because only 
one of them will finally count for the actual payment. 
Finally, in the social-repeated condition, the corresponding text read as follows. 
Once you have seen the prize won, and the prize not won, resulting from your 
choice, a second message in blue will appear in the center of the screen. This 
message will show again the prize you have won and, right next to it, in 
squared brackets, the prize won by another participant in this room on the 
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same decision. Therefore, if you have obtained 5u and the other participant has 
obtained 10u, you will see a message like this 
5 [10] 
namely, the prize you won [the prize won by the other participant] 
This message is only informative, since the other person’s winnings have no 
influence on your winnings. The person whose earnings you will see in blue 
brackets will be the same for all decisions during this experiment (he/she can 
be any person of this room and he/she has been chosen at random upon 
starting). This person will have played the same lotteries at the same time as you. 
He/she will also be shown your earnings in each trial, in the same way that you see 
his/hers. Everything is anonymous, so you will never know his/her identity, nor 
he/she will know yours. Finally, remember that you will receive payment in real 
money corresponding to one decision and only one, randomly selected by the 
computer at the end of the experiment. Thus, your task is to choose the lottery you 
prefer in every decision, regardless of your choice in the other trials, because only 
one of them will finally count for the actual payment. 
  
 
 
